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COURT OF APPEALS, 1955 TERM
the court, an attorney is held to a higher standard of conduct than are his fellow
citizens, and once his conduct becomes a matter of reasonable doubt, it is up to
him to come forward and satisfy the court of his general fitness for his profession.
The dividing line seems not to be ultimate conviction or acquittal on appeal,
but rather intitial conviction or acquittal at the trial level.
5 "
The dissent seems to confuse the difference in considerations between rights
and privileges. In effect it states that an illegal conviction is a nullity6 and of no
effect and therefore the respondent stands in the shoes of a man waiting trial for
the first time. This is undoubtedly true in any case concerning a person's legal
rights.¢ However, the privilege of practicing law calls for conduct about which
there is no reasonable doubt-the legality of which there is no need for a jury
to decide. This, it seems, is implicit in the statute when it calls for summary dis-
barment upon a conviction for a felony8 and then provides that upon a reversal
of such conviction, an application for reinstatement must be made.'
Banking-Illegal Discounts
There is in New York a clear policy to prohibit corporations not subject to
the supervision of the banking department from engaging in any form of
banking.10 An instance of this is the provision in section 18 of the General
Corporation Law and section 131 of the Banking Law which prohibit non-banking
corporations from discounting notes and make such discounted notes void."
5. See note 4, supra.
6. People ex rel Sloane v. Lawes, 255 N. Y. 112, 174 N. E. 80 (1930).
7. See note 6, supra.
8. N. Y. JUDICIARY LAW §90(4), supra, note 2.
9. N. Y. JUDICIARY LAW §90(5). Upon a reversal of the conviction for felony
of an attorney and counsellor-at-law ... the appellate division shall have power
to vacate or modify such order or debarment. It Re Stein, 249 App. Div. 382, 292
N. Y. Supp. 828 (1st Dep't 1937).
10. New York Trust and Loan Co. v. Helmer, 77 N. Y. 64 (1879); Meserole
Securities Co. v. Cosman, 253 N. Y. 130, 170 N. E. 519 (1930); But see Pratt v.
Short, 79 N. Y. 437, 35 Am. Rep. 531 (1880) terming the intent of the legislature
in enacting the early counterpart of §131 N. Y. BANKING LAW merely an interest
to protect the chartered banks in the monopoly of banking.
11. N. Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAW §18: No corporation, domestic or foreign,
other than a corporation formed under or subject to the banking laws of this
state or the United States, and except as thereifi provided shall by any implication
or construction be deemed to possess the power of carrying on the business of
discounting bills, notes or other evidences of debt ... or engaging in any other
form of banking ... (emphasis added). N. Y. BANKING LAW §131: . . . No cor-
poration, domestic or foreign, other than a national bank or a federal reserve
bank, unless expressly authorized by the laws of this state, shall employ any
part of its property, or be in any way interested in any fund which shall be
employed for the purpose of receiving deposits, making discounts .... All notes
and other securities for the payment of any money or. the delivery of any prop-
erty, made or given to any such association, institution or company, or made or
given to secure the payment of any money loaned or discounted by any corpora-
tion or its officers, contrary to the provisions of this section shall be void.
(emphasis added).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Meserole Securities Co. v. Cosman,12 the leading case dealing with the meaning
and intent of these statutes, held that the notes "discounted" by the plaintiff were
not void under the provisions of these sections because there was not the kind of
discounting that the legislature meant to forbid. What was meant to be included
in the prohibition were discounts such as are carried on by a bank of discount;
that is, where the note is discounted in order to accomplish a loan and not a
"discoune' which is an integral part of a transaction which is in form and fact a
pzrchase or trading bargain. Only the former is prohibited.
In the recent case of Miller v. Discount Factors,13 notes for $15,000 with
interest at 6% were made by a corporation payable to its president and endorsed
both by the president and his brother-in-law, the plaintiff (apparently as an accom-
modation14 ), to the defendant, a corporation organized under the Stock Corpora-
tion Law, who deducted and retained a $675 "bonus charge" and paid the remain-
der directly to the maker. Subsequently the maker defaulted and the plaintiff, after
paying part of the notes, brought an action to recover such payments as having
been made under mistake of law,' 5 thus bringing into issue the validity of the
notes under the preceeding sections. The court held (5-2) that the notes were
void.16 The transaction was found to be a clear discount, a deduction of compensa-
tion for the loan in advance. Labeling it a bonus does not make it different.17
The situation here is not that in Meserole, which involved previously existing
and valid notes,'8 but is instead a creation of the discounted notes as security
for the loan. The apparent distinction drawn by the instant case between valid
and void notes depends upon whether the discount was of prior notes or notes
created specifically as an incident to the discounting transaction; the former trans-
action is a "purchase" and not within the prohibition, while the latter is a "loan"
and clearly within it.
12. 253 N. Y. 130, 170 N. E. 519 (1930).
18. 1 N.-Y. 2d 275, 135 N. E. 2d 33 (1956).
14.. The practical effect of these sections which make the prohibited notes
void is to release accommodation endorsers or makers because there can be an
action for unjust enrichment against persons who received value. See Pratt v.
Short, 79 N. Y. 437, 39 Am. Rep. 531 (1880).
15. The plaintiff's action was consolidated with a suit by the holder on the
unpaid notes.
16. The decision in favor of the defendant was affirmed, however, on the
ground that the' jury found that the payments were not made under mistake.
17. The Appellate Division held in favor of validity of the notes in part
upon the reasoning that a "bonus" was hot interest and bore no relation to It,
and therefor no discount resulted, apparently ignoring the fact that the bonus
plus the 6% called for in the notes exactly totaled 2% per month or 24% a year.
285 App. Div. 772, 141 N. Y. S. 2d 140 (1st Dep't 1955).
18. The notes in Meserole were made and endorsed by persons other than
the "seller", and were valid and in existence before the time of the "discounting"
transaction with the plaintiff, and were made by a maker to a payee both of
whom were apparently unconnected with the plaintiff and in a transaction ap-
parently divorced from the "discounting" in question.
COURT OF APPEALS, 1955 TERM
A relatistic approach, apparent in the language of Meserole, would involve
an exception from the prohibition of the statutes, of discounts which are part of
a commercial transaction, as, for instance, the practice of factors who for over
130 years have been discounting the notes of their consignors, in conjunction with
the consignment transaction.19 The Meserole holding, however, went beyond this
and excepted also preexisting notes given for what practically was a loan. The
instant case refuses to carry this extension to notes created for the purposes of
the loan.
Under the present test, then, it appears that if the transaction in Discount
Factors were carried on with prior notes of the maker, and the loan were made
not directly to the maker but to the plaintiff, the latter would be a "seller" and
although the loan would go through him to the maker, so that the net effect
would be the same as that which did result, the notes would have been valid.
Although the line between purchase and loan has been recognized as sometimes
difficult to draw,20 an attempt such as this might be pierced by the court. The line,
however, is apparently that only of the court, and will continue to be drawn on a
case by case basis until the legislature sees fit to finally clarify the applications of
these sections.
Confracts-Inferprefaf ion
When the words of a contract are unequivocal, a court should give them their
full effect.2 1 Extrinsic evidence will not be allowed to change the meaning, where
the words are plain and dear, and convey a distinct idea.22 Such contracts leave
little room for interpretation and the courts construe the contracts accordingly.
The question then arises as to what should be done with ambiguous terms in a
contract. The answer lies in a well known rule of construction that is applicable
to instruments of doubtful meaning. A construction should be given to a contract
that will consider all the words and phrases rather than a construction that will
render some terms nugatory.2 3 Words should not be ignored or considered sur-
plusage unless they clearly conflict with the intention and purpose of the con-
tract.2 4 Thus the interpretation that gives effect to all the words and terms in the
contract, should be preferred over an interpretation that ignores some words in
the contract.
2 5
19. Meserole Securities Co. v. Cosman, 253 N. Y. 130, 136, 170 N. E. 519,
521 (1930).
20. Meserole Securities Co. v. Cosman, supra at 147, 170 N. E. at 525.
21. Rockcliffe Realty Corp. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Y. Y., 50 N. Y. S. 2d
851 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
22. Matter of Western Union Tel. Co. 299 N. Y. 177, 86 N. E. 2d 162 (1949).
23. 2 CLARK, NFW YORK LAW OF CONTRACTS §808 (1922); Fleischman v. Fur-
gueson, 223 N. Y. 235, 119 N. E. 400 (1918).
24. Gail v. Gail, 127 App. Div. 892, 112 N. Y. Supp. 96 (4th Dep't 1908).
25. Buffalo East Side R.R. Co. v. Buffalo Street R.R. Co., 111 N. Y. 132,
19 N. E. 63 (1888).
